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When rendering judicial opinions, should judges rely on the laws of the land
or on the laws of religion? In 2002, Alabama Supreme Court's Chief Justice
Moore argued in a concurring opinion for a per se rule denying homosexuals the
right to parenthood in part on "the law of nature and of nature's God as under-
stood by men through reason, but aided by direct revelation found in the Holy
Scriptures."' According to Chief Justice Moore, homosexual conduct of a parent
"creates a strong presumption of unfitness that alone is sufficient justification for
denying that parent custody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adop-
tion of the children of others."2 This Comment will examine Chief Justice
Moore's opinion in light of Kent Greenawalt's principles of restraint for judges
set forth in Private Consciences and Public Reasons.' Greenawalt maintains that
only in rare circumstances may judges rely on their own religious beliefs, and
even in those rare circumstances, judges should not include personal convic-
tions-whether moral or religious-in written judicial opinions.' Chief Justice
Moore violated Greenawalt's principles of restraint when he incorporated his
own personal convictions in his opinion in Ex parte H.H. Greenawalt's princi-
ples of restraint will be explained in Part II of this Comment. In Part III, Ex
parte H.H. will be examined and will then be analyzed in Part IV using
Greenawalt's principles of restraint. Finally, the propriety of Greenawalt's prin-
ciples of restraint will be discussed in Part V.
II. GREENAWALT'S PRINCIPLES OF RESTRAINT
A. The Principle of Public Accessibility: Accessible Grounds Versus
Nonaccessible Grounds
In Private Consciences and Public Reasons, Greenawalt explores the ques-
tion, "What grounds are proper for people making political decisions and argu-
ments within a liberal democracy?"' Greenawalt sets forth principles of restraint
for public officials and concludes that judges are the most constrained of all pub-
lic officials.' Greenawalt's principles of restraint and, in particular, his belief that
"religious beliefs should remain outside politics" are based on two grounds: (1)
the inaccessibility of religious beliefs and (2) the recognition of incompatible,
diverse religious beliefs in the United States.7 According to Greenawalt,
* The author thanks Professor Mark Modak-Truran for his guidance and objectivity in the drafting of this
Comment.
1. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 32 (Ala. 2002).
2. Id. at 26.
3. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at4,141.
7. Id. at 4.
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If freedom of religion exists, diverse religious views are bound
to emerge and continue; religion engenders such strong passions
that it will inevitably be a source of tension; and that tension will
be aggravated by reliance on religious grounds in political deci-
sions and arguments. Relatedly, social unity in liberal democra-
cies will always be fragile enough so that argument in terms of
nonaccessible grounds will be harmful.'
Greenawalt emphasizes that in a pluralist society such as the United States,
political decisions and arguments should be based on grounds that are accessible
to others, in other words, grounds that are open and available to all.9 In
Greenawalt's own words, "Do not publicly rely on grounds that are not accessi-
ble to others."10 Nonaccessible grounds are grounds that are not open and avail-
able to all and should not be used." For Greenawalt, "the critical feature of
appropriate political grounds" is "public accessibility."12
B. Accessible Views
Greenawalt sets forth the following three types of accessible grounds that
are appropriate bases for political decision-making because they are open and
available to all: (1) realist grounds, (2) shared social grounds, and (3) authority
grounds. 3
1. Accessible Views Based on Realist Grounds
Realist grounds are open and available to all and are, therefore, appropriate
grounds for political decision-making and argument. A realist ground is a moral
claim that asserts an objective truth as opposed to mere taste or preference,
which is subjective. 4 Realist grounds consist of moral claims that remain valid
or true regardless of "what people in a particular time and place happen to think
is moral."'5 Realist grounds withstand the test of time, place, and culture. 6 For
example, according to Greenawalt, "[A] great many moral and political judg-
ments can be justified on accessible realist grounds: 'Other things being equal,
happiness is better than pain, love is better than hate, health is better than illness.
. [and] people should act to promote health, happiness, and love, rather than ill-
ness, pain, and hate."" 7
8. Id. at 130.
9. Id. at 128.
10. Id.
11. See id. at 142.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Id. at24.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 27.
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According to a realist view, moral claims are objectively true or false."8 The
truth or falsity of a moral claim must be reached by common human understand-
ing, not just a select few individuals. 9 Greenawalt clarifies that moral realism
does not "include a view that God reveals moral truth to a selected few."2 He
cautions that individuals can be mistaken as to the truthfulness of a moral
claim." He further cautions that not all realist claims can be relied upon because
some realist claims may violate a more basic moral right of liberty and personal
autonomy. 2 For example, a realist argument that watching sports on television
is unproductive may perhaps be true.23 However, it is not a valid argument for
censorship because it violates a moral right to liberty and personal autonomy.24
2. Accessible Views Based on Shared Social Grounds
The second type of appropriate grounds for political decision-making is a
shared social ground.25 Shared social grounds are grounds based on widely held
beliefs or, in other words, beliefs held by a broad consensus. 2 According to
Greenawalt, shared social grounds may "extend beyond what can be justified
directly on accessible realist bases."27 Shared social grounds are closely related
to realist grounds, and people often have difficulty distinguishing the two.28
However, because both grounds are appropriate grounds for political decision-
making, distinguishing the two is not vital. 9
An example of a shared social ground is the belief that the government
should treat all people equally." Greenawalt proposes that "[c]oercing people on
the basis of widely shared principles ... is ordinarily appropriate."31 However,
he warns that some shared social grounds may be faulty.32 Sometimes shared
social grounds are the product of faulty values developed because of conditions
during a particular time in history.33 For example, because of unjust male domi-
nation, it was once a widely held view that women should be denied opportuni-
ties based solely on gender.'4 According to Greenawalt, unjust domination is a
powerful argument against a shared social assumption.8 "Any explicit argument
based on shared social values must be ready to meet challenges that the values
have illegitimate or unhealthy roots. 36




22. Id. at 23-24.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Id. at 23-24, 27.
25. Id. at 28.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 29.
29. Id. at 29-30.
30. Id. at 28.
31. Id.




36. Id. at 30.
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3. Accessible Views Based on Authority Grounds
The third and final appropriate ground for political decision-making is
authority. Legislators, judges, and executive officials are all constrained by writ-
ten constitutions. 7 Greenawalt distinguishes the following three types of legal
authority: (1) straightforward applications, (2) discretionary exercises, and (3)
difficult interpretations. 8 Straightforward applications involve issues that the
law directly addresses. Here, there is no need to consider realist or shared social
grounds.39 In these circumstances, an official should obey the law." The second
type of legal authority is discretionary exercises. Discretionary exercises occur
when a particular law allows officials discretion. 2 In these circumstances, offi-
cials should use realist and shared social grounds in exercising their allowed dis-
cretion.43 Finally, the third type of legal authority involves interpretations. 4
Sometimes judges and other officials must interpret the law or, in other words,
must provide judgment as to what the law should be said to require. 45 In these
instances, judges and officials should also rely on accessible realist grounds or
shared social grounds.46
C. Nonaccessible Views
Nonaccessible views should not be relied upon in political decision-making.
A nonaccessible view is a belief that has no basis of proof. 7 In the words of
Greenawalt, "[T]he believer lacks bases to show others the truth of what he
believes."48 He offers three reasons for rejecting grounds for political decision.4
The first reason is an intrinsic inadequacy, meaning that the grounds are erro-
neous because of faulty methodology or assumption." The second reason is
unfairness, referring to grounds that impair a person's right to equality or
liberty.51 According to Greenawalt, "[I]n relations among people, or citizens,
respect for integrity and equality precludes using some bases for decision that
might otherwise be appropriate." 2 Finally, the third reason for rejecting a politi-
cal ground is the likelihood of threat to social harmony, stability, or progress. 3
37. Id. at 31.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 31-32.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 32.
44. Id. at 31-32.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id. at 33.
47. See id. at 39.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 24.
50. Id. at 23-24.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id.
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Greenawalt identifies three particular kinds of nonaccessible views that should
not be included in political decision and argument. Those views include (1) reli-
gious views, (2) views about the good life, and (3) comprehensive views. 4
However, he emphasizes that people should not rely on beliefs that cannot be
"reasonably assessed by others," regardless of whether the belief is religious,
comprehensive, or about the good life.
55
1. Religious Views
The first category of nonaccessible views is a view based on religion.
6
Greenawalt defines religion as that which "typically concerns a level of ultimate
truth that is beyond, or deeper than, mundane human existence ... [and] prac-
tices and organizations (such as the Ethical Culture Society [or Buddhism]) that
largely replicate those of ordinary religions but do not make similar assumptions
about ultimate truth. 57  Because religious views are generally nonaccessible,
Greenawalt believes that such views may be inappropriate grounds for political
decision-making.58 This does not mean that nonbelievers cannot understand reli-
gious arguments but merely that such arguments will not be persuasive to nonbe-
lievers. 9 According to Greenawalt, religion generally involves "a choice or
judgment based on personal experience that goes beyond what reason can estab-
lish."60
Greenawalt offers three reasons why religion or other "claims believed to be
accessible by the persons who make them" should not figure into political deci-
sion-making and argument." First, a history of religious conflict provides sup-
port for abstaining from religious arguments.62 Second, there is a problem of
accessibility in practice.63 This refers to situations in which a particular religious
argument is a realist one, yet the argument is still not given much weight. 4
Greenawalt suggests that such a weak argument should not be relied upon to
coerce others. 5 He offers as an example a person who believes that "a chain of
reasoning about prophecies, miracles, and demonstrably effective prayer shows
that scripture carries authority and is literally true."66 However, the person also
54. Id. at 5.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 5, 39.
58. Id. at 39 (It is important to note that Greenawalt does provide the following three "possible accessible
grounds" for religious beliefs: (1) philosophic arguments for God, (2) independent historical evidence, and (3)
"fruits of conviction," meaning that evidence of the "goodness" of a religious belief is demonstrated by the ful-
filling lives of the individuals practicing that belief. Id. at 40-41.).
59. Id. at 145.
60. Id. at 40.
61. Id. at 44.
62. Id. at 45-46.
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recognizes that many individuals do not accept the argument as being a strong
one.67 Therefore, the person should refrain from using the weak, unpersuasive
argument. 8
Last, a high error factor is the final reason for not using some realist argu-
ments. 9 These are arguments that society at one time held valid yet later reject-
ed because of error.7" Greenawalt proposes that legal prohibition of conduct
should be based on harms and benefits-not because the conduct is regarded as
a sin."1 He specifically asserts that homosexual acts should not be penalized
solely because they are regarded as sinful.7
2. Views About the Good Life
The second category of nonaccessible views that should not be included in politi-
cal decisions and arguments is views about the good life. Views about the good
life are beliefs as to human good and virtue, including controversial moral claims
about personal ethics and obligations." Religious beliefs can fall into this cate-
gory because they "tell us how to live."74 However, some religious beliefs
extend beyond this category because they also cover principles of social impor-
tance.7 Greenawalt quotes Charles Larmore as stating that the State "should not
seek to promote any particular conception of the good life because of its pre-
sumed intrinsic superiority-that is, because it is supposedly a truer concep-
tion."76 The State should not use views about the good life as a basis to coerce
individual behavior.7 Greenawalt clarifies, "[T]he thesis of neutrality about con-
troversial conceptions of the good should be understood as mainly directed to
actions of the state that coerce individual behavior."78
3. Comprehensive Views
The third category of nonaccessible views that should have no place in polit-
ical decision and argument is comprehensive views. "Comprehensive views
include overarching philosophies of life, whether religious or not."79
Utilitarianism, Marxism, and Millian liberalism are examples of comprehensive





71. Id. at 6.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 5, 79.
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 80.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 39.
80. Id.
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However, Greenawalt suggests that it is better to classify religious views sepa-
rately to avoid confusion.81 An example of a nonreligious comprehensive view
is an atheist who subscribes to Marxism or utilitarianism.82 Greenawalt con-
cludes, "[P]eople should refrain from relying upon all grounds that cannot be
reasonably assessed by others, whether or not the grounds are religious, whether
or not they are features of comprehensive views, and whether or not they are
related to ideas of the good."'
D. Proper Political Grounds Versus Proper Political Discourse
and Ordinary Citizens Versus Public Officials
Greenawalt argues that his proposed principles of restraint "correspond sub-
stantially" to principles of restraint that currently exist in the United States.8 4
However, he believes that there are nuances in these principles of restraint that
have not been recognized by most theorists.85 He distinguishes between proper
political grounds and proper political public discourse.8 Greenawalt also distin-
guishes between what is proper for citizens as opposed to what is proper for pub-
lic officials.8 Under Greenawalt's principles of restraint, individuals are allowed
more freedom as to their grounds or bases for a political decision.88 However,
greater restraint is placed on public discourse.89 He suggests that citizens may
rely on religious convictions when they consider difficult political issues." As
for legislators and executives, it is appropriate for them to take into account the
religious views of citizens, their constituents. 1 They may also sometimes rely
on their personal religious convictions as well. 2 However, for judges, only in
rare instances may they rely on such personal convictions. 3
1. Citizens
Ordinary citizens have the most liberty when it comes to proper political
grounds and proper political discourse. 4 Because of an appreciation for reli-
gious liberty, Greenawalt rejects any restraint on ordinary citizens when it comes
to their reasons or bases for a particular political position or decision.9" He
believes that ordinary citizens may rely on religious convictions when making
81. Id. at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 6-7.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 156-63.
87. Id. at 7, 156-63.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 159-61.




94. See id. at 159-61.
95. Id. at 159-60.
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decisions about difficult political issues." As for public discourse, he believes
that most citizens are not involved in political advocacy "beyond talking to fami-
ly, close friends, and associates" and should not be confined in that setting to
reliance on public accessible grounds. 7
Greenawalt further distinguishes ordinary citizens from quasi-public citi-
zens.9" Quasi-public citizens are involved in broader public debate and include
such people as media commentators and editors, presidents of large corporations
and organizations, and law professors.99 Greenawalt does place a restraint on the
public discourse of these individuals."' He believes that these individuals
should employ public reasons when publicly addressing political issues.101
According to Greenawalt, restraint in public discourse is not too much to request
of these individuals because they are "reasonably sophisticated in their under-
standing of public discourse and political life, and they have experience in many
settings of expressing less than their full feelings about subjects.""1 2
2. Legislators and Executives
As for legislators and executives,"' Greenawalt believes that they may
appropriately take into account the religious views of their constituents and even
"may sometimes rely on their own religious or similar convictions." '
However, in public discourse "explicit reliance on any controversial religious or
comprehensive view would be inappropriate." ' Although Greenawalt believes
that legislators "should mainly employ public reasons," he clarifies that he is
referring to religiously grounded arguments "that connect particular religious
premises to conclusions of policy.""1 He emphasizes that it is appropriate in
public discourse for legislators to refer to religious imagery or tradition, to call
upon God's help in deliberations, and to participate in "wider cultural discus-
sions of the significance of religion for human life and moral values.
1 0 7
3. Judges
As for judges, Greenawalt declares that they are the most constrained of all
public officials with regard to proper political grounds and public discourse.08
Only in rare circumstances may judges rely upon personal convictions.10 9 He
96. Id.






103. Id. at 156 (Greenawalt assumes that the standards for public discourse of executives should be similar to
that of legislators. "If there is any difference, executives should regard themselves as more constrained,
because they speak for all the people in a fuller sense than does any individual legislator.").
104. Id. at 7.
105. Id. at 157.
106. Id. at 158.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 141.
109. Id. at 7.
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adopts the traditional model that judges should not make decisions based on per-
sonal convictions."' However, he does recognize that this model is aspira-
tional.111 He concedes, "The aspiration is not fully achievable even if all judges
are intelligent, well-trained, and conscientious, but it is worth striving for by
emphasizing that bases of legal judgment should be open and available to all. 112
He further concedes that judges "cannot entirely" make decisions free of person-
al moral convictions.113 He states, "[F]undamental beliefs will influence deci-
sion even when judges conscientiously try to exclude them .... [D]eeply held
religious convictions will sometimes have an influence on judgment." ' 4
According to Greenawalt, "shared premises and ways of reasoning have pri-
ority and ... will get judges all of the way in the vast majority of cases." '  His
view is that only in exceptional, rare circumstances are judges allowed to use
personal convictions, whether religious or comprehensive.1 ' He provides three
exceptions to these principles of restraint for judges."' The first exception is
"when, if ever," the matter or issue before the court directly necessitates the use
of a religious or comprehensive view. ' Professor Modak-Truran"1 ' proposes
that an example of this might be what the Supreme Court was called upon to do
in Lynch v. Donnelly-interpret the religious significance of the nativity scene. 20
The second exception is "when if ever," the precedent is conflicting or is "radi-
cally indecisive." '21 Finally, the third exception is "when, if ever, the judge finds
'the law' to be so abominable that he or she feels a duty to subvert it in some
way." '122 He offers as an example a judge who considered slavery so evil that
during the era of slavery he might have accordingly evaded the law.'23
Greenawalt further argues that reliance on moral and political philosophy is
more appropriate than reliance on personal religious convictions.124 "[J]udges
have reason to rely on moral philosophy that draws from basic premises of our
social and political order or rests on generally accepted ways of reasoning rather
than on their own religious convictions."'25 The reason why some grounds are
preferred is not because they are better but because they are shared.2 '
Therefore, he concludes, "[Rieliance on some kinds of moral and political phi-
losophy is easier to justify for judges than reliance on their own religious
beliefs."'27
110. Id. at 142.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 144.
114. Id.




119. Mark Modak-Truran, Associate Professor of Law at Mississippi College School of Law, Lecture on
Law and Religion (Fall 2002).
120. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 670-71 (1984).
121. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 149.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 149-50.
124. Id. at 146-47.
125. Id. at 147.
126. Id. at 146.
127. Id.
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Although Greenawalt acknowledges that judges must sometimes on rare
occasions rely on personal convictions in decision-making, he believes that
judges should never include such personal convictions in their written opin-
ions. 128 Judges should only disclose in their opinions justifications available to
all, even though personal moral convictions self-consciously entered into their
decisions.129 He defends this position against criticism of being dishonest and
insincere by claiming that it would be counterproductive to include religious or
comprehensive grounds "if the extra grounds developed are unlikely to enlighten
others, may hinder constructive dialogue, and will probably cause feelings of
exclusion and alienation."'30
Ex parte H.H. is a case in which Alabama's Chief Justice Moore violated
Greenawalt's principles of restraint and the traditional model for judges. Chief
Justice Moore based his opinion in part on religious and personal convictions.
Furthermore, he did not hesitate to include his religious and personal convictions
in his written concurring opinion. Therefore, this case will be examined and
analyzed according to Greenawalt's view.
III. Ex parte H.H.
Ex parte H.H. involved a petition by a mother requesting physical custody
of her three minor children.131 In November 1992, the mother and father, both
residents of California, were divorced, and the California court gave primary
physical custody of the parties' three minor children to the mother. 32 In 1996,
the mother petitioned the California court for a custody modification giving
physical custody to the father, who had moved to Alabama following their
divorce. 33 Her request was granted.
1 34
In February 1999, the mother filed another petition for custody modification
in a California court requesting that physical custody of the children be returned
to her.1 31 In April 1999, the father filed a complaint requesting that the case be
transferred to Alabama, and his request was granted. 38 In June 2000, the Circuit
Court of Jefferson County, Alabama denied the mother's request of modification
of custody. 7  The trial court based its decision on a finding that the mother had
failed to meet the evidentiary standards set forth in Ex parte McLendon.'38
According to the McLendon standard, "[A] party seeking a custody modification
must show that the change in custody will materially promote the child's best
interests, and that the benefits of the change will offset the disruptive effect
caused by uprooting the child.
1 39
128. Id. at 143.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 164.






137. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 24.
138. Id. (citing Exparte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984)).
139. Id.
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A. The Facts According to the Alabama Supreme Court and the Facts According
to the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals
At the trial court hearing, disputed testimony was offered.14 The mother tes-
tified that the father physically abused the three children: a sixteen-year old
daughter (who was away at camp and not present to testify); E.H., a fifteen-year
old son; and A.H., a thirteen-year old son. "1 According to the Alabama Supreme
Court, the mother testified that "the father had slapped E.H., causing his nose to
bleed."142 However, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that the father dis-
puted this testimony (1) by admitting to slapping E.H.; (2) by claiming that it
was done to punish E.H. for hitting the daughter; (3) by testifying that after hit-
ting E.H., he gave him a five to ten minute lecture "about why it was wrong to
hit people"; and (4) by claiming that E.H.'s nose did not bleed.'43 According to
the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, E.H. testified that the "father hit him in
the nose, causing it to bleed ... [and] removed from the mailbox a letter he had
written to the mother to describe the incident."
144
According to the Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama, E.H. also admitted to
writing a poem about committing violent acts upon the father and his stepmoth-
er.141 Concerning the poem, E.H. testified, "I would want to but I would never
do it.' 41 6 E.H. further testified that the father kept guns in the house, which were
unlocked and accessible.1 4' The Supreme Court of Alabama did not elaborate on
this testimony and simply stated that E.H. "indicated that he did not like his
father because he was too strict and that he would rather live in California with
his mother, who was less strict." '148 The Alabama Supreme Court also pointed
out that the mother had referred to the father in an e-mail as "a great dad" after
finding out about the incident of the father hitting E.H. and did not report the
incident to the Department of Human Resources (hereinafter "DHR") until fif-
teen months after this litigation began.
149
According to the Alabama Supreme Court, the mother also testified that the
father had slapped the daughter and, on another occasion, had kicked her "boom
box" across the room because she would not turn down the volume." Again,
the court determined that the father disputed this testimony by testifying that he
had slapped the daughter only after she had used profane words in the context of
swearing on The Bible and that he had kicked the "boom box" but not "across
the room."''
140. Id. at 23.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 23.




148. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 24.
149. Id. at 23.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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The Alabama Supreme Court stated that the father testified to using "many
different disciplinary measures, including 'timeouts,' requiring permission
before using appliances, and having the sons sit with paper bags on their heads
(without restricting their air)." 52 The court further noted that DHR had visited
the home and had taken no action.53 However, the Alabama Civil Court of
Appeals again elaborated on these "many different disciplinary measures.
'
"154
According to that court, the father admitted to "slapping the children in the face
and whipping them with a belt and a hanger." ' He also admitted to one occa-
sion of making the boys sit in the yard with paper bags over their heads for thir-
ty-three minutes because they had been late in meeting him at a specified time in
the mall. 56
The father also stated that another disciplinary measure that he used was
making the children ask permission to get food from the refrigerator and to use
electrical appliances.157 He also admitted that he intercepted the children's mail
and e-mails to their mother and taped their telephone calls. 5 The Alabama
Supreme Court pointed out that the father testified that "he tape-recorded the
telephone calls because the children acted suspiciously and secretive after they
returned from a visit with their mother." '59 The Alabama Supreme Court further
clarified that the father disabled the children's e-mail for awhile "because the
daughter had given her address to a man on the Internet." 6°
According to the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals, E.H. testified that the
father punished him by either physically hitting him or by not allowing him the
use of the bathroom, electricity, and the refrigerator. 61 E.H. further testified that
whenever he asked his father if he could live with his mother, the father would
use derogatory terms concerning the mother's sexual orientation.62 The father
admitted to routinely calling their mother a "lying alcoholic lesbian." '63
The opinion of the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals also reveals that A.H.,
the youngest son, testified that he had seen the father hit E.H. in the face and had
heard the father hit his sister."M A.H. also testified that the father whipped them
all and called them profane names. 65 He also expressed a desire to live with his
mother because of his bad relationship with his father and stepmother. 66 He
stated that "it was easier to talk to the mother because she would not ridicule
him, whereas,... the father might hit him." '67 He said that he had quit "playing
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 23.




159. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 23.
160. Id.





166. Id. at 19-20.
167. DA!, 830 So. 2d at 20.
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sports because his father had 'hinted that it was wasting his time-that he didn't
want to come to the games."'168 He further testified that his stepmother "had
'taken over' the computer" that his maternal grandmother had given him and
that she "had deleted all of their games."'69 The Alabama Supreme Court simply
revealed, "A.H., the youngest child, testified that he did not like his stepmother
because she had 'taken over' his computer."' 70
The Alabama Civil Court of Appeals also elaborated on the mother's current
circumstances; whereas, the Alabama Supreme Court did not. The mother testi-
fied to her stability: (1) being employed with Universal Studios for fifteen years;
(2) earning moderate income; (3) living "in the same house that the children had
grown up in"; (4) being involved with her children in "community service pro-
jects, church activities, and extracurricular school activities" when she had phys-
ical custody of the children; (5) being a recovering alcoholic since 1995; and (6)
having "resided with her female companion since December 1995," and having
entered into a statutory domestic partners' agreement with her companion in
April of 2000.'
The mother stated that it was her desire that her children live with her so that
they could and would be living in a "nonsmoking, nondrinking, nonviolent
household." ' To meet her burden of proving a material change in circum-
stances, the mother offered evidence of "the children's poor grades, lack of
extracurricular activities, lack of religious training, and living in an environment
with family violence."'73 When asked if she would consider ending her relation-
ship with her domestic partner, she commented, "We had talked about this. And
it would be really difficult because she is a part of our family. But my kids are
number one and their safety and well-being are first and foremost. And so yes,
that would be an option."' 4
B. Alabama Civil Court of Appeals
The Alabama Civil Court of Appeals concluded that the mother had present-
ed sufficient evidence demonstrating that "a change in custody would materially
promote the children's best interests and welfare."' 75 The court highlighted the
mother's stability and concluded that "[n]o evidence indicated that the mother's
homosexual relationship, which is accepted under California law through the
'Domestic Partnership Act,' would have a detrimental effect on the well-being
of the children.' ' 76 The court also determined that "the father's verbal, emotion-
al, and physical abuse can be considered family violence, and that abuse consti-
168. Id. at 19-20.
169. Id. at 20.
170. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 24.






MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
tutes a change of circumstances.""17 The Court cited Alabama's Custody and
Domestic or Family Violence Abuse Act.178
The court also noted that the following factors were considered important
but were not controlling: (1) the age of the children, (2) the desire of the chil-
dren, and (3) the "interpersonal relationship between each child and each par-
ent." '179 While the court recognized "the presumption of correctness that attaches
to a trial court's judgment that is based on ore tenus evidence," the court
reversed the trial court's decision based on the conclusion that "evidence con-
tained in the record does not support the judgment. 's
C. Alabama Supreme Court's Majority Opinion
The Alabama Supreme Court held that "the Court of Civil Appeals imper-
missibly reweighed the evidence." 's The Alabama Supreme Court first noted
the following findings of the trial court:
That the [mother] previously had custody and voluntarily
surrendered custody to [the father]. The [mother] says the
[father] is a domestic abuser. The [father] says the [mother] is
an alcoholic lesbian. There can be no surprise that these chil-
dren have serious issues in their lives. In fact, it is probably
remarkable that the children have done as well as they have.
While not approving of the [father's] occasional excessive
disciplinary measures or condoning the [mother's] lifestyle, this
Court cannot rewrite the lives of the parties or [the] children. It
can only rule based upon application of the law to the facts in
evidence and attempt such remedial measures as may seem
appropriate." 2
The court stressed that the standard of review in cases involving evidence
presented ore tenus is that "in the absence of specific findings of fact, appellate
courts will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support
its judgment, unless such findings would be clearly erroneous." '  The court
made the following conclusion concerning the decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals to reverse the trial court's order:
Although there was some testimony, standing alone, that might
suggest abuse, this evidence was disputed at trial. The trial
judge, who was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of
the testimony and who observed the demeanor of the witnesses,
177. D.H., 830 So. 2d at 20 (citing E.M.C. v. K.C.Y., 735 So. 2d 1225 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)).
178. ALA. CODE § 30-3-131 (1975).
179. D.H, 830 So. 2d at 20.
180. Id. at 20-21 (emphasis added).
181. Exparte HH., 830 So. 2d at 25.
182. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 25 (quoting Exparte Bryowsky, 676 So. 2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1996) (citation omitted)).
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found that, although the father's disciplinary actions may occa-
sionally be excessive, no abuse had occurred .... The Court of
Civil Appeals, however, adopted the mother's arguments with-
out acknowledging the existence of contradictory testimony that
supported the trial court's holding.184
D. Chief Justice Moore's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice Moore opened his concurring opinion by stating the following:
I write specially to state that the homosexual conduct of a par-
ent--conduct involving a sexual relationship between two per-
sons of the same gender-creates a strong presumption of unfit-
ness that alone is sufficient justification for denying that parent
custody of his or her own children or prohibiting the adoption of
the children of others.185
He further stated, "Homosexual conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent,
immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a violation of the laws of nature
and of nature's God upon which this Nation and our laws are predicated."'88
He argued that such behavior is destructive to society, destructive and detri-
mental to children, and "an inherent evil against which children must be protect-
ed." '87 He vehemently opposed the Civil Court of Appeals characterization of
homosexual conduct as not having a detrimental effect on children. 88 He retort-
ed that it is not "an appellate court's duty to redefine the morals of the State of
Alabama."' 88
Chief Justice Moore provided legal precedent in Alabama condemning
homosexuality and proclaiming it a crime. For example, in Exparte .JMF., the
Alabama Supreme Court declared that a homosexual lifestyle is 'neither legal
in this state, nor moral in the eyes of most of its citizens."'"8 Likewise, in Ex
parte D. W. W., the Alabama Supreme Court made clear that homosexual conduct
violates the criminal law of Alabama and that "the restriction of visitation was a
'common tool [] used to shield a child from the harmful effects of a parent's
illicit sexual relationship-heterosexual or homosexual. '"'181 Chief Justice
Moore also cited the Alabama Code that makes homosexual conduct a misde-
meanor.82 In Williams v. State, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals con-
184. Id. at25-26.
185. Id. at 26 (Moore, C.J., concurring).
186. Id.
187. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 26.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 27.
190. Id. at 28 (quoting Exparte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Exparte D.W.W., 717
So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998))).
191. Id. (quoting Exparte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d at 796).
192. Id. at 29 (citing ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65).
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cluded that homosexual conduct "involves moral turpitude, 193 which Chief
Justice Moore emphasized-means evidence of 'an inherent quality of base-
ness, vileness, [and] depravity,' and 'implies something immoral itself, regard-
less of the fact whether it is punishable by law.'
194
Chief Justice Moore next used common law to justify Alabama's law con-
demning homosexuality. 95 He began by noting that American law was derived
from the common law of England. 96 He cited William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England97 as "authoritative for applying the com-
mon law today" and based his argument that natural law is a part of common
law on Blackstone's Commentaries.'98 According to Chief Justice Moore, com-
mon law was founded on natural law.199 Based on Blackstone's Commentaries,
he defined natural law as "the law of nature and of nature's God as understood
by men through reason, but aided by direct revelation found in the Holy
Scriptures."2 ' Again, using Blackstone's Commentaries as authority, he
explained, "[B]ecause our reason is full of error, the most certain way to ascer-
tain the law of nature is through direct revelation."2 1 According to Blackstone's
Commentaries, common law or "human law" is based on natural law and
revealed or divine law found in the Holy Scriptures. 2 Furthermore, natural law
and divine law are superior to human laws.0 3
Chief Justice Moore cited additional sources indicating that "human laws are
only declaratory of, and act in subordination to, the former [divine and natural
law] .' °
James Wilson, Associate Justice on the first United States
Supreme Court and signer of both the Declaration of
Independence and the United States Constitution, said: "Human
law must rest its authority ultimately upon the authority of that
law which is divine .... Far from being rivals or enemies, reli-
gion and law are twin sisters, friends, and mutual assistants.
Indeed, these two sciences run into each other.
205
John Jay, first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court and coauthor of the Federalist Papers, declared: "[N]o
193. Williams v. State, 316 So. 2d 362, 363 (Ala. 1975).
194. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 30 (quoting Williams, 316 So. 2d at 363 (Ala. 1925) (quoting McELROY,
LAW OF EVIDENCE IN ALABAMA § 145.01(7) (2d ed. 1959))).
195. See id. at 31-35.
196. Id. at31.
197. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42.
198. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 31.





204. Ex. parte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 32 (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 42).
205. Id. (quoting JAMES WILSON, Of the General Principles of Law and Obligation, in 1 THE WORKS OF THE
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 104-06 (Bird Wilson ed., Bronson and Chauncey 1804)).
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sovereign ought to permit those who are under his Command to
violate the precepts of the Law of Nature, which forbids all
Injuries .... 206
Chief Justice Moore quoted the following passage of the Declaration of
Independence as further evidence of the superiority of natural and divine law:
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary
for one people to dissolve the political bonds which have con-
nected them with another, and to assume among the powers of
the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of
nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes
which impel them to the separation.
217
Chief Justice Moore argued that it would defy logic to declare that our
founding fathers could use "the laws of nature and of nature's God" to separate
or secede from their country but could not use "the law of God" to "decide the
fundamental basis of their laws."2 8
Finally, Chief Justice Moore concluded, "[H]omosexuality is strongly con-
demned in the common law because it violates both natural and revealed law."2 9
He pointed to the following Old Testament verse found in Leviticus 20:13 con-
demning homosexuality: "[I]f a man lies with a male as he lies with a woman,
both of them have committed an abomination."21 According to Chief Justice
Moore, American laws that condemn homosexuality were founded on this pas-
sage.211 He went on to quote Roman law found in the Corpus Juris Civilis,
which, as Moore pointed out, served as the basis for the law of the Christian
Church and European and English civil law: "Sodomy is high treason against the
King of Heaven.1
2 12
Chief Justice Moore defended his position disfavoring homosexuality as not
being "invidious discrimination" and not "legislating personal morality." ' He
claimed that the State's interest in promoting the general welfare of the people
validated his opinion."' He stated, "Providing for the common good involves
maintaining a public morality through both our criminal and civil codes, based
upon the principles that right conscience demands, without encroaching on the
206. Id. (quoting John Jay's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Virginia, May
22, 1793, Richmond, Virginia, in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800 at 386 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988)).
207. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 33.
210. ExparteH.H., 830 So. 2dat 33.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 34 (quoting Raymond B. Marcin, Natural Law, Homosexual Conduct, and the Public Policy
Exception, 32 CREIGHTON L. REv. 67, 67 (1998) (quoting 58 C.J. 785 n.10 (1932))).
213. Id. at 35.
214. Id.
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jurisdiction of other institutions and the declared rights of individuals."21 He
further stated, "The State carries ... the power to prohibit conduct with physical
penalties, such as confinement and even execution. It must use that power to
prevent the subversion of children toward this lifestyle, to not encourage a crimi-
nal lifestyle."2 '
Chief Justice Moore viewed the awarding of child custody to a parent who
engaged in homosexual conduct as rewarding that parent for committing a
crime.21 He considered this "a reprehensible affront to the laws of family gov-
ernment that the State must preserve."21 He argued against change by stating
the following:
No matter how much society appears to change, the law on this
subject has remained steadfast from the earliest history of the
law, and that law is and must be our law today. The common
law designates homosexuality as an inherent evil, and if a per-
son openly engages in such a practice, that fact alone would
render him or her an unfit parent.1 9
Chief Justice Moore went on to describe homosexual conduct as "an inher-
ent evil, and an act so heinous that it defies one's ability to describe it."" 0 He
concluded with the following words:
The common law adopted in this State and upon which our laws
are premised likewise declares homosexuality to be detestable
and an abominable sin. Homosexual conduct by its very nature
is immoral, and its consequences are inherently destructive to
the natural order of society. Any person who engages in such
conduct is presumptively unfit to have custody of minor children
under the established laws of this State.
21
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Chief Justice Moore's Concurring Opinion-A Violation of Greenawalt's
Principles of Restraint?
1. Was It Appropriate for Moore to Rely on His Religious Convictions in His
Deliberations?
Greenawalt would consider Chief Justice Moore's reliance on his personal
religious convictions inappropriate. According to Greenawalt, only in rare cir-
cumstances may a judge, the most constrained public official, rely on his or her
215. Id. (emphasis added).
216. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 35.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 37.
221. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
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personal convictions.22 2 Again, Greenawalt's exceptions to this rule are (1)
when the issue before the court directly necessitates the use of religion, (2) when
the precedent is conflicting or indecisive, or (3) when "the judge finds 'the law'
to be so abominable that he or she feels a duty to subvert it in some way. '223 The
first exception was not met because unlike the issue of the religious significance
of the nativity scene considered in Lynch v. Donnelly,24 the issue of the parental
fitness does not directly necessitate the use of religion. Neither was
Greenawalt's second exception met because, according to Chief Justice Moore,
Alabama precedent was on his side. The precedent in Alabama was not conflict-
ing or indecisive.
Greenawalt's third exception that allows a judge to rely on personal convic-
tions when the law is "so abominable" to the judge "that he or she feels a duty to
subvert it in some way" was arguably not met either for two reasons. 225 First, the
existing Alabama law, according to Chief Justice Moore, was not abominable to
him. According to Chief Justice Moore, the law was in his favor. He argued
that homosexual conduct was clearly illegal in Alabama and that precedent
allowed the restriction of parental visitation to protect a child from the parent's
illegal homosexual relationship. 22 Therefore, the use of religion was unneces-
sary.
Secondly, it is arguable that Greenawalt's third exception should only be
used when a class of individuals or an individual's right to liberty or personal
autonomy is being violated, not when the State is trying to coerce or restrain
individual behavior. In Greenawalt's example, the judge who found slavery
repugnant would have properly subverted the law to protect the liberty rights of
a class of individuals, not to restrain those liberty rights. 227 Also, according to a
basic position of Greenawalt, "prohibition should depend on harms and benefits
that are comprehensible in nonreligious terms in this life. '228 Because none of
the exceptions were satisfied, based on Greenawalt's view, Chief Justice Moore
inappropriately relied on his religious convictions.
2. Was It Appropriate for Chief Justice Moore to Express His Religious
Convictions in His Written Opinion?
It has already been determined that Chief Justice Moore inappropriately
relied on his religious convictions. However, for the sake of argument, assum-
ing Chief Justice Moore might have appropriately relied on his religious convic-
tions, was it appropriate for him to include those convictions in his written opin-
ion? According to Greenawalt, the answer is a simple, "no-never."
222. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 149.
223. Id.
224. Lynch, 465 U.S. 668.
225. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 149.
226. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 28.
227. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 149-50.
228. Id. at 6.
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Greenawalt states, "I believe that even when the opinion represents the voice of
a single judge, the opinion should symbolize the aspiration of interpersonal rea-
son and be limited to public reasons." '229
However, for Chief Justice Moore, Alabama law is based on common law,
and common law is based on natural law, which is derived from "divine or
revealed law."'230 Blackstone and at least two members of the first United States
Supreme Court considered natural law and Christianity part of the common
law.231 He pointed out that Blackstone and two members of the first United States
Supreme Court believed that divine law superceded human laws. 2 Finally,
based on the Declaration of Independence's reference to "the laws of nature and
of nature's God," Chief Justice Moore concluded that "the law of God" was used
by our founding fathers "to decide the fundamental basis of their laws."2"
This historical argument by Chief Justice Moore might be countered by
Greenawalt's historical argument. Greenawalt argues, "The history of religious
conflict in Western Europe and the growth of toleration and liberal democracy
out of that conflict inform all the principles of restraint that people now pro-
pose." '234 Greenawalt claims that reliance on religious grounds "is contrary to
fundamental premises of separation of church and state and religious liberty, or
is particularly threatening to social life." '235 Greenawalt asserts, "The most basic
defense of separation of church and state is that it is conducive to religious liber-
ty; religious liberty is considered more fundamental than nonestablishment of
religion."26
However, it is important to note that Greenawalt does not believe that all
reliance on religious grounds is improper.237 He recognizes that our country's
political life has historically been influenced and continues to be influenced by
religion.3 ' However, he concludes that the worries of William Marshall239 pro-
vide the best argument for keeping religion out of politics.240 "'Religion, if
unleashed as a political force, may also lead to a particularly acrimonious divi-
siveness among different religions.' Fervent beliefs may become fuel for intol-
erance, repression, hate, and persecution. "241
A prime example of a fervent belief that becomes fuel for intolerance,
repression, hate and persecution is Chief Justice Moore's intense moral convic-
tion that the State should punish homosexual parents by denying them parental
custody rights. Chief Justice Moore referred to the State's "power to prohibit
conduct with physical penalties, such as confinement and even execution."'242 He
229. Id. at 150.
230. ExparteH.H., 830 So. 2d at 32-34.
231. Id. at 31-32.
232. See id.
233. Id. at 33.
234. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 62.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 67.
237. Id. at 69.
238. Id.
239. William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L. J. 843 (1993).
240. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 70.
241. Id. (quoting Marshall, supra note 238, at 859).
242. ExparteH.H., 830 So. 2d at 35 (emphasis added).
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concluded that the State "must use that power to prevent the subversion of chil-
dren toward this lifestyle, to not encourage a criminal lifestyle." '243 He consid-
ered the granting of child custody to a homosexual parent "a reprehensible
affront to the laws of family government that the State must preserve."2'4 These
statements indicate the intensity of Chief Justice Moore's personal moral con-
viction. Again, according to Greenawalt and the traditional model, judges
should not rely on personal convictions.24
Another example of Marshall's concern of a fervent religious belief becom-
ing "fuel for intolerance, repression, hate, and persecution""24 is Chief Justice
Moore's attempt to create new law declaring a homosexual parent presumptively
unfit.24 According to Chief Justice Moore, "if a person openly engages in such
a practice, that fact alone would render him or her an unfit parent." '248 This clear-
ly violates Greenawalt's model for judges and the traditional model for judges.
Greenawalt states, "Officials who apply laws must pay attention to authority." '249
Chief Justice Moore has no authority upon which he can base this assumption.
He claimed to be basing his opinion on law. It is true that, as Chief Justice
Moore points out, Section 1 3A-6-65(3)(b) of the Alabama Code classifies devi-
ate sexual intercourse as a Class A misdemeanor.250 It is also true that the defini-
tion of "deviate sexual intercourse" found in Section 13A-6-60(2) of the
Alabama Code covers homosexual conduct." ' However, it is not true that the
commission of a Class A misdemeanor alone would render a parent unfit.
Chief Justice Moore also quoted an Old Testament verse calling homosexual
conduct "an abomination." '2 52 He concluded that his position was justified
because homosexual conduct violates not only common law but also natural and
revealed law.25 3 Chief Justice Moore's reliance on the Old Testament violates
Greenawalt's rule against using nonaccessible grounds because it excludes those
who do not accept the Holy Scriptures as truth. This ground is not acceptable
because it is not open to all.
Another one of Greenawalt's reasons for rejecting this nonaccessible view is
because unfairness would result.254 In other words, a person's right to equality
or liberty would be impaired. 5 Denying a parent the custody of his or her chil-
dren based solely on the parent's sexual orientation is denying that parent the
right to equality and liberty. In the words of Greenawalt, "[I]n relations among
people, or citizens, respect for integrity and equality precludes using some bases
for decision that might otherwise be appropriate.""2 6
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 142.
246. Id. at 70 (quoting Marshall, supra note 238, at 859).
247. See Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 35.
248. Id.
249. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 31.
250. See ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65(3)(b) (1975).
251. See id. § 13A-6-60(2).
252. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 33.
253. Id.
254. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 24.
255. Id.
256. Id.
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However, Chief Justice Moore argued that his position was "not invidious
discrimination nor is it legislating personal morality. 25 7 He believed that his
position was "based upon the principles that right conscience demands. 2 58 This
argument might be an example of a view based on the "good life," a view that
Greenawalt believes should also be excluded.29 As stated previously, views
about the good life are beliefs as to human good and virtue, including controver-
sial moral claims about personal ethics and obligations.60 Chief Justice Moore
is presuming that his view is intrinsically superior and is, therefore, trying to
coerce individual behavior. This view "about the good life" is not an appropri-
ate basis for a judicial opinion.
Chief Justice Moore also argued that homosexual conduct has a detrimental
effect on children.2 ' This argument is another example of a nonaccessible view
because it has no basis of proof. In the words of Greenawalt, "[T]he believer
lacks bases to show others the truth of what he believes. 262 The argument that
children of homosexual parents suffer detrimental effects is based on an assump-
tion, which may or may not be true. Finally, Chief Justice Moore argued that
homosexuality was "an abominable sin. '262 According to Greenawalt, legal pro-
hibition of conduct should be based on harms and benefits and not because the
conduct is regarded as a sin.264 As noted previously, Greenawalt specifically





B. The Majority Opinion-A Violation of Greenawalt's Principles of Restraint?
It has previously been determined that the issue of parental fitness of a
homosexual parent does not fit into one of Greenawalt's exceptions to the rule
against judges using religion as a basis for decision. However, again, assuming
for the sake of argument that it does fit into one of Greenawalt's exceptions, is
the majority opinion an example of how Chief Justice Moore, according to
Greenawalt, should have written his opinion? Remember that Greenawalt
believes that judges should not include religious views in their written opinions
even though they relied on those views. Judges should only disclose in their
opinions justifications available to all, even though personal moral convictions
self-consciously entered into their decisions.266 A comparison of the Alabama
Supreme Court's opinion to that of the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals indi-
cates that it is quite possible that the majority did not include its entire bases for
decision in the written opinion. After comparing the two conflicting opinions,
one might question whether personal moral convictions self-consciously entered
into the Alabama Supreme Court's decision.
257. ExparteH.H., 830 So. 2d at 35.
258. Id.
259. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 5.
260. Id. at 5, 79.
261. Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 26.
262. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 39.
263. ExparteH.H., 830 So. 2d at 38.
264. GREENAWALT, supra note 3, at 6.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 143.
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The Alabama Supreme Court held sacred the trial court's characterization of
the father's abuse inflicted upon his children as "occasional excessive discipli-
nary measures.""26 However, the Alabama Civil Court of Appeals determined
that the father's conduct toward his children constituted family violence, which
amounted to a change of circumstances warranting "a change in custody [that]
would materially promote the children's best interests and welfare." '288
The Alabama Supreme Court criticized the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
for "adopt[ing] the mother's arguments without acknowledging the existence of
contradictory testimony that supported the trial court's holding." '269 However, it
appears that the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals gave in its opinion a more
detailed account of the trial court record. Whereas, it appears that the Alabama
Supreme Court omitted much of the testimony concerning the father's abusive
outbursts. The Alabama Supreme Court even appears to excuse the father's abu-
sive outbursts."' Even though the majority opinion of the Alabama Supreme
Court did not focus on the mother's homosexual relationship, it begs the ques-
tion, "Why excuse the abuse?"
Instead of focusing on the mother's homosexual relationship, the court
seemed to focus on first, that the mother was initially given custody and, subse-
quently, "after the mother had begun a homosexual relationship," had "herself'
requested that the father be granted custody.7 1 Secondly, the court pointed out
that the mother had referred to the father as "a great dad" in an e-mail after being
told that the father had hit E.H. causing his nose to bleed and that the mother did
not report the incident to DHR until fifteen months after litigation began.2
The Alabama Supreme Court downplayed the abuse by emphasizing that (1)
the father admitted the abuse; (2) it was performed as punishment for E.H. hit-
ting the daughter or because the daughter used profane words in the context of
swearing on the Bible; (3) the father only kicked the daughter's "boom box" and
did not kick it "across the room"; and (4) the father made the sons wear paper
bags over their heads but did not restrict their air. 3 The father characterized
forms of punishing the children such as hitting them, denying them use of the
bathroom, electricity, and the refrigerator, or making them sit outside wearing
paper bags over their heads for thirty-three minutes as "us[ing] many different
disciplinary measures.11211 In its re-characterization of the father's "abuse," the
court stated that these "many different disciplinary measures" included "'time-
outs,' requiring permission before using appliances, and having the sons sit with
paper bags on their heads (without restricting their air). 275
267. ExparteH.H., 830 So. 2d at 24.
268. See D.H., 830 So. 2d at 20.
269. See Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 25-26.
270. Id. at 23-26.
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The Alabama Supreme Court completely ignored or downplayed the desire
of the two sons, ages fifteen and thirteen, to live with their mother. As for
E.H.'s testimony regarding a desire to live with his mother, the court stated that
E.H. wanted to live with his mom because she was less strict. The court com-
pletely ignored his testimony concerning the abuse and omitted the testimony
about the poem in which he described violent acts against the father and step-
mother.
The court simply stated that the younger son "testified that he did not like
his stepmother because she had 'taken over' his computer." '276 The court ignored
his testimony that the computer was given to the children by the maternal grand-
mother and that the stepmother had deleted all of their games. It also omitted his
testimony as to his father's abuse and his bad relationship with his father. It fur-
ther omitted the son's testimony that it was easier for him to talk to his mom
because she would not ridicule him whereas his father might hit him.'
It appears that the Alabama Supreme Court, not the Alabama Civil Court of
Appeals, failed to acknowledge "the existence of contradictory testimony."
Why did the Alabama Supreme Court ignore, omit, or downplay the testimony
of abuse? Was the Alabama Supreme Court simply following the law that does
not allow an appellate court to "sit in judgment of disputed evidence presented
ore tenus before the trial court,"-the court "in the best position to make a cus-
tody determination" because "it hears the evidence and observes the
witnesses"?278 Or is it possible that the Alabama Supreme Court failed to meet
the aspirational goals of judges to not make decisions based on personal convic-
tions? According to Greenawalt, judges "cannot entirely" make decisions free
of personal moral convictions. 9 "[F]undamental beliefs will influence decision
even when judges conscientiously try to exclude them .... [D]eeply held reli-
gious convictions will sometimes have an influence on judgement."28
Finally, if, as suggested by Chief Justice Moore, the law is so clear in
Alabama that homosexual conduct is illegal and precedent allows restricting vis-
itation to protect a child from a parent's illegal homosexual relationship, why
did the majority not base its written opinion on that law and precedent? Could it
be that the majority recognized that the argument might be based on what
Greenawalt referred to as "values that have illegitimate or unhealthy roots"-
illegitimate and unhealthy roots of prejudice against homosexuals?281
276. Id. at 24.
277. See D.H., 830 2d at 20.
278. See Exparte H.H., 830 So. 2d at 24.
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V. CONCLUSION
I conclude with the words of Greenawalt that, in my humble opinion, are
proper and appropriate.
If I am going to coerce others, I should have reasons that I think
are fairly applicable to them. Simply satisfying my own person-
al feelings about a subject is not sufficient in a society that
accepts basic notions of liberty and equality. The freedom of
people to decide what to do with their lives should not be sub-
ject to the whim of others, even a majority, about what happens
to feel right.2"2
282. Id. at 37.

